Inequality, imperfect competition, and fiscal policy by Balamatsias, Pavlos
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Inequality, imperfect competition, and
fiscal policy
Pavlos Balamatsias
24 October 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82556/
MPRA Paper No. 82556, posted 10 November 2017 07:09 UTC
Inequality, imperfect competition and fiscal policy 
Pavlos Balamatsias 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses a simple model of an economy with imperfect competition in the goods 
markets and heterogeneous individuals. We then examine how the combination of income 
inequality, and imperfect competition, affect taxing and spending policies. Results indicate 
that firms’ market power and income inequality positively affect the size of fiscal multipliers, 
meaning that spending and taxing multipliers are bigger the more unequal an economy is. We 
also use the balanced budget multiplier to examine how income inequality and imperfect 
competition affect the net increase in output and expenditure caused by fiscal policies. The 
model shows that in highly unequal societies the maximum net increase in output and 
expenditure comes when increased government spending is funded by taxing the minority of 
high-income workers, as the adverse effects on the economy will be smaller compared to a 
tax imposed on the majority. However, this result changes as the economy becomes more 
equal and for high enough percentages of the population belonging in the high-income group 
the maximum net increase in output and expenditure comes when the government increases 
government spending and taxes low-income people instead. Finally, we examine the welfare 
effects of government policies. We see that while taxes reduce taxpayers’ welfare, if the net 
increase in output and expenditure is big enough, fiscal policy can be Pareto improving, as 
both income groups benefit from it; or at least the income group not paying taxes benefits 
while the income group paying taxes is not worse off. Income inequality is once again crucial 
in our analysis as it affects the size of welfare losses the taxpaying segments of the population 
have and whether government policies can be Pareto improving. 
(JEL classification codes:  D63, E12,E62) 
Keywords :  Income inequality, Fiscal multiplier, Public Expenditure, Taxation     
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1. Introduction 
    Economic theory has long established that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
plays an important part in the economic decisions of individuals (Blanchard and Johnson 
2012:47). Also recent work by Carroll, Slacalek and Tokuoka (2014) and by Carroll, 
Slacalek, Tokuoka and White (2016) has confirmed the theoretical assumption that there 
exists a inverse relationship between income and an individual’s MPC with wealthier 
individuals using a smaller percentage of their income for consumption and vice versa. These 
works have also shown that there exists considerable variation in the MPC between different 
income groups in an economy and the reason for this variation is the distribution of income 
between the different income groups, or in other words income inequality. 
    An important implication of these findings is that income shocks have a different effect on 
individuals and that income inequality affects economic policy; however, most economic 
models do not incorporate income inequality or even the MPC in their analysis. Simple new 
Keynesian models such as Mankiw (1987), Molana and Moutos (1992) and Torregrosa (1999) 
and even more complex DSGE models like Bouakez and Rebei (2007), Ercolani (2007) and 
Forni, Gerali and Pisani (2010) either operate under the assumption of the representative 
agent or, even if they have heterogeneous agents, do not use the MPC in their analysis. For 
that reason, we will try to create a simple model with income inequality, which results in 
different MPCs. More specifically we use a simple general equilibrium model of an economy 
with imperfect competition as in Mankiw (1987), Molana and Moutos (1992); but we expand 
it by adding heterogeneity, in the form of increased skill endowment, and this heterogeneity 
along with the different MPCs results in income inequality between individuals. We then 
examine how income inequality and imperfect competition can influence fiscal policy. 
    Our results indicate that the magnitude of fiscal multipliers is influenced by imperfect 
competition and income inequality. In the case of government spending, our findings show 
that the multiplier of government spending is bigger the greater imperfect competition and the 
more unequal the economy is. Examining the impact of taxation, we see that inequality and 
imperfect competition influence the magnitude of the multiplier in the same way they affect 
government spending. Additionally when using the balanced budget multiplier we find that 
income inequality and imperfect competition also have an effect on the net economic impact 
of fiscal policy. Using the balanced budget multiplier, we see that in unequal societies, where 
the majority of the population has low incomes, increasing government spending and then 
taxing the minority of high-income workers achieves the maximum net increase in output and 
expenditure. However, as the percentage of high-income workers increases, fiscal multipliers 
become smaller and so does the impact of spending and taxation. Consequently, for sufficient 
percentages of high-income workers the maximum net increase in output and expenditure 
comes when the government increases spending and finances it by taxing the minority of low-
income workers. Finally, we examine the welfare effects of government policies. The findings 
show us that government spending financed by taxation can benefit both income groups; or at 
least benefit the income group that does not pay any taxes while eliminating the welfare 
losses of the income group that pays taxes, leading to a Pareto improvement. Income 
inequality plays an important part once again because it positively affects the welfare losses 
of taxation. These results suggest that fiscal policy which takes into account income 
inequality between individuals and uses the right mix of spending and taxation can help 
stabilize the economy and promote growth while minimizing any welfare losses.  
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the model of our 
economy. Section 3 has an analysis of public spending schemes financed by lump-sum, labor 
and profit taxes respectively. Section 4 analyses the welfare effects of government policies 
and how income inequality affects them. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The economy 
    The model we will use is based on a simple new Keynesian model of imperfect 
competition like the ones of Mankiw (1987), and Molana and Moutos (1992). We construct 
the simplest economic model possible in order to illustrate the main idea we want to present 
in this paper. Since our main objective is to examine how income inequality affects fiscal 
policy, we will refrain from using more complex general equilibrium models, which could 
alter but not invalidate our argument. 
2.1 Individuals 
    We assume that the economy is populated by a continuum of individuals indexed 
by )1;0( . A percentage λ of those individuals belong to Type 1 and have no skill 
endowment, while the remaining )1(   percentage are Type 2 individuals, who have high 
skill endowment due to education or work experience. 
    The time available to all individuals equals T. This time is divided between working 
hours,  and leisure, L . However, as we mentioned Type 2 individuals are skilled workers; 
for this reason their labor productivity is bigger. Therefore the effective labor supply of a 
Type 2 individual is )( i  where 0i  shows the increased productivity of a Type 2 
worker. The labor supply of a Type 1 individual equals   . Wages are equal to the amount of 
labor supplied by each individual so Type 1 workers have a wage equal to  and Type 2 
workers have a wage equal to )( i .    
    People choose between two goods, consumption and leisure. As we have seen in Carroll, 
Slacalek and Tokuoka (2014) and in Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka and White (2016) individuals 
with higher incomes use a smaller percentage of their income for consumption compared to 
those who have smaller incomes; in other words their MPC is smaller. For this reason, we 
assume that Type 1 people choose more consumption and less leisure compared to Type 2 
individuals.  
    Each individual maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function where he chooses between 
consumption ( iC ) and leisure ( iL ) based on the information we analyzed in the previous 
paragraphs: 
11111 log)1(log LaCaU  ,    11 a      (1) 
22222 log)1(log LaCaU  ,    12 a      (2) 
        Based on our assumptions about the differences between individuals and the 
aforementioned literature, we assume that 21    which shows that Type 1 individuals use 
a greater percentage of their income for consumption, compared to Type 2 individuals who 
have bigger incomes but consume a smaller percentage of their income. 
    Individuals are also the owners of the economy’s firms and receive profits   while they 
pay all taxes. We first assume that people pay a lump-sum tax, iV  but we will later change 
that assumption. Each individual’s budget constraint is therefore: 
ii VLTPCi  )(  , 
ii VTLPCi    (3) 
    As we mentioned before, 1  and 2 , denote the share of income which is used for 
consumption. Using these indexes, we find the consumption function of every type of 
individual. 
)( 111 VTPC     (4) 
])[( 222 VTPC i     (5) 
    Equations (4) and (5) are the consumption functions for each one of the two types of people 
in the economy and 21 ,  denote their MPCs. Note that in equation (5) the consumption of 
Type 2 individuals is higher by i . That is because these individuals can consume more due to 
their higher skills and higher incomes. However, this effect is mitigated by their lower MPC.     
2.2 Firms 
    We have a number of M firms in the economy, and each firm produces quantity q of a 
single good using labor as their only input. The demand function for the whole industry 
equals: 
P
Y
Q    (6) 
where Q is total output of the industry P the price level and Y is the economy’s expenditure. 
    The cost function of each firm is: 
cqFqTC )(   (7) 
    We assume, as in Mankiw(1987) and Molana and Moutos(1992) that firms operate in an 
environment of imperfect competition and have market power. We calculate market power by 
using the Lerner Index (Lerner 1934: 157-175) 
P
MCP     (8), 
where μ is the Lerner index, MC the marginal cost and P the price level. 
    Combining equations (6) and (8) and by differentiating equation (7) we get the following 
equation describing the demand function of the industry: 
Y
c
Q
)1(    (9) 
    We then calculate total profits for the whole industry which equal revenue minus the costs: 
cQMFPQ   (10) 
Using equation (9) and assuming for simplicity that fixed costs are equal to zero we express 
profits in terms of expenditure and the profit mark-up that firms have: 
Y  (11) 
Equation (11) shows that profits in the economy depend on expenditure. 
2.3 Government 
    Government raises revenue from taxation in order to produce and provide a single public 
good to the economy. The level of taxes raised is equal to 21 VV   and it is used to buy goods 
produced by the firms, which are then used as input to produce the public good. This public 
good can be some form of social service (e.g. education, healthcare) or purely economic in 
nature (e.g. production of energy, fuel, manufacturing goods and infrastructure by 
government owned enterprises). The government budget constraint requires that spending 
equals revenue: 
GVV  21   (12) 
)(qfG    (13) 
2.4 Total expenditure and output 
    Total output in the economy is equal to the sum of expenditure of the private sectors i.e. 
Type 1 and Type 2 individuals and government expenditure: 
GPCY i   (14) 
Using equations (4) and (5) and the population percentages to substitute in equation (14) we 
find: 
GVTaVTaY i  ])[()1()( 2211    (15) 
Using equation (11) and rearranging terms we find an expression that also makes use of the 
Lerner index: 
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    Equation (16) shows that in our model output is affected by taxation (Vi), government 
spending (G) and the Lerner index (  ), just like in other New-Keynesian models of 
imperfect competition. Private consumption also plays a role through the different MPCs ( ia ) 
which are, as we noted before, a result of income differences. However when we allow for the 
existence of heterogeneous agents, we see that consumption and in turn output is not affected 
by the MPC alone, but rather by income inequality, which is the product of income 
distribution and the MPC ( 1  and 2)1(  ). Different labor supplies, and subsequently 
different wages (T and iT  ), also play an important role since the bigger the difference, the 
bigger income inequality will be.   
 
 
3. Fiscal policy using different tax financing sources 
    In this section, we examine the impact of income inequality and imperfect competition on 
fiscal policy. Specifically we examine how imperfect competition and income inequality 
affect the size of fiscal multipliers. In addition, using the balanced budget multiplier seen in 
Mankiw (1987) we examine the effect of imperfect competition and income inequality on the 
net increase on output and expenditure, i.e. the net economic effect of fiscal policies. For the 
time being we ignore any changes these policies can cause in the welfare of any income group 
and focus only on the effect that government spending and taxation have on output and 
expenditure. We will deal with this issue in section 4, where we examine the welfare losses 
that these policies can cause and the possibility of a Pareto improvement. 
3.1 Government spending financed by lump-sum taxes 
    First, consider an increase in government spending, financed by increasing lump-sum 
taxes: 
 ])1([1
1
21 aadG
dY
     (17) 
    This result is similar to the government spending multiplier seen in most textbooks. As 
expected increases in government spending raise expenditure and output in the economy. As 
we can see the increase in output and expenditure caused by government spending becomes 
greater the more market power firms have. This happens because increases in government 
spending help raise profits, which in turn raise expenditure and output in the economy even 
further in the way, the textbook Keynesian public spending multiplier and the multiplier in 
Mankiw (1987) work. In the limiting case where μ=0 this process ends after the initial 
increase in government spending and the multiplier is unity. Therefore imperfect competition 
is crucial in our analysis because as firms’ market power increases, 
dG
dY
 approaches the 
standard government spending multiplier of Keynesian models which is greater than unity.  
    The important finding in this model however is that income inequality positively affects 
government spending multipliers. Just like in ordinary Keynesian models, the MPC has a 
positive effect on the size of the multiplier but in the case of heterogeneous agents it is the 
product of the MPC and the percentages of people belonging to each income group – in other 
words income inequality – that affect fiscal multipliers. According to equation (17) the bigger 
income inequality is, the bigger the fiscal multiplier of government spending becomes; this 
means that increases in government spending lead to a greater rise in output and expenditure 
the bigger income inequality in an economy is. This happens because as income inequality 
increases, the percentage   of people belonging to the Type 1 category which has lower 
incomes but a bigger MPC of 1  increases as well; at the same time the percentage  1  of 
Type 2 people who have higher incomes but a smaller MPC of 2  decreases with income 
inequality. As a result the more unequal an economy, the bigger ))1(( 21   becomes, 
which in turn means that the denominator becomes smaller and that the overall result of 
equation (17) becomes bigger.  
    Therefore in highly unequal economies where   21 1   , the overall consumption 
of Type 1 people is much bigger compared to the consumption of Type 2 people who have the 
smaller MPC of 2 , because they individually consume much more than Type 2 people do 
and also because they constitute a much larger segment of the population. Consequently, the 
overall effect in output and expenditure from increased public spending in an unequal 
economy will be much bigger when compared to a more equal economy. This is why in 
highly unequal economies where the majority of the population belongs to the low-skill, low-
income group increases in government spending have a bigger positive effect on output and 
expenditure. 
    After increasing government spending, the government chooses which population group to 
tax in order to have a balanced budget: 
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    As we can see in equations (18) and (19) the size of the fiscal multiplier of taxes is 
positively affected by the size of market power, and by income inequality, just like in the case 
of public spending in equation (17). Just like in the case of government spending, when 
  21 1    - in other words in a highly unequal economy - total consumption of Type 1 
individuals is much bigger compared to the consumption of Type 2 people, because they 
individually consume much more than Type 2 people do (since 21   ) and also because 
they constitute a much larger segment of the population. Therefore, the negative effect of a 
tax increase in output and expenditure will be bigger in economies that are more unequal. 
    As the percentage of high-skilled workers in the economy increases, the effects of fiscal 
policy change. Government spending multipliers become smaller the more equal the economy 
becomes because ))1(( 21    is now smaller since more people now belong to the 
)1(  percentage of people who have higher incomes and as result a smaller MPC of 2 ; 
this means that they use less of their extra income for consumption. Moreover, since high-
income workers are now a bigger part of the population, the negative effect that taxing these 
individuals has on the economy becomes bigger. However taxing high-income workers 
remains the best policy. Eventually, for sufficiently high percentages of high-income workers, 
i.e. when 12)1(   , taxing the minority of low-income individuals will have a smaller 
negative effect in output and expenditure than taxing high-income workers. 
    In order to examine the net economic impact of fiscal policy we use the balanced budget 
multiplier seen in Mankiw (1987), which gives us the net increase in output and expenditure 
caused by increased government spending financed by taxes. To use this multiplier we simply 
subtract equations (18) and (19) from equation (17): 
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    Equations (20) and (21) show us the net increase in expenditure and output caused by 
increased government spending when Type 1 or Type 2 people are taxed respectively i.e. the 
balanced budget multiplier. Comparing equations (20) and (21) helps us find which income 
group should be taxed when government spending increases in order to achieve the maximum 
net increase in output and expenditure. This comparison also reveals the effect of income 
inequality on the net effects of fiscal policy. 
    As we can see when comparing the balanced budget multipliers, the crucial term in the 
analysis is income inequality. In a highly unequal economy, where 12)1(   , the 
maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes when the government increases 
government spending and taxes the minority of high skilled, high-income workers as the 
adverse effects on expenditure and output will be smaller. The logic behind this idea is one 
analyzed before: In an economy where the majority of the population belongs to the low-
income group taxing these people has a greater adverse effect on the economy due to that 
group’s greater MPC and because they represent such a big part of the population. Hence, 
high-income individuals should be taxed because they have smaller MPCs and constitute a 
smaller part of the population. As the percentage of high-income workers increases and they 
become the majority, the negative effect of taxing these people increases. Eventually when 
the number of Type 2 workers becomes big enough that 12)1(   , the maximum net 
increase in output and expenditure comes when the government increases government 
spending and balances the budget by taxing low-skilled, low-income workers as the adverse 
effects on expenditure and output will be smaller since they now are the minority.  
3.2 Government spending financed by labor taxes 
    We now examine the case where a labor tax is used in order to finance the government 
budget. To study this case we make a few changes in equations (3), (4), (5) and (12). More 
specifically, we no longer have a lump-sum tax, but rather a tax on labor income equal to Lit . 
The new budget constraints for each income group and for the government are given by:  
 
  )1( 111  TtPC L   (22) 
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    GtTtT LtiLt LL  21 21 )(   (24) 
    Equation (15) which represents the total output function is modified accordingly, when the 
government uses taxes on labor. Rearranging terms yields an expression similar to (16):  
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    Again, we examine the effect of government spending financed by taxing the two different 
population groups: 
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    Equation (26) is the same as equation (17) so we do not need to analyze this result again. 
However, looking at equations (27) and (28) we see the major difference between labor taxes 
and lump-sum taxes. As we can see, the magnitude of the tax multiplier is affected by income 
inequality and by the firms’ market power the same way as before. However, in the case of 
labor taxation we see that labor supply itself can also affect output and expenditure in two 
ways: The first one is through the decrease in income caused by taxes. When a tax is imposed 
on labor then for every hour worked, the individual worker receives a lower return on his 
labor; this results in reduced expenditure and output in the economy. The product of our 
measure of income inequality and the left hand side term in the parentheses ( 1a  and 
)()1( 2 iTa   in equations (27) and (28) respectively), captures this effect for each 
income group.  
    The second way labor taxes reduce output and expenditure is through the labor – leisure 
tradeoff that takes place when taxes on labor increase. When labor taxation is imposed, 
workers decide to either increase work hours in order to achieve a certain income level 
(income effect) or to decrease their labor supply and increase their leisure instead 
(substitution effect). If the second effect is stronger this may cause a loss in  their welfare, as 
well as in output and expenditure in the whole of the economy, above and beyond the loss 
caused by the revenues that the government collects by increasing taxes; in other words 
deadweight loss. The terms 1Le  and 2Le  are the labor elasticities of Type 1 and Type 2 people 
respectively; when multiplied with the term outside the parentheses –income inequality– they 
give us the deadweight loss for each income group. Assuming that 1Le  and 2Le  are positive 
as in Harvey and Gayer (2013) workers will reduce their labor supply when labor taxes 
increase, meaning that the substitution effect dominates, which further reduces output and 
expenditure in the economy. In the limiting case where 1Le  and 2Le  are equal to zero and 
labor supply is perfectly inelastic the deadweight loss is equal zero as well.  
    Since high-income workers have a higher labor supply of )( iT  > T  the negative effect 
that taxing these individuals has on output and expenditure will be bigger, compared to a tax 
levied on low-income individuals. The size of labor supply elasticity is also important, for 
example if 1Le  < 2Le  in other words if the labor supply of high-income workers is more 
elastic, taxing these workers causes a bigger reduction of output and expenditure due to 
bigger deadweight losses. However, the percentage )1(  of people belonging in the high-
income group and their MPC of 12    can mitigate the negative effects of taxing high-
income workers. Intuitively, even though high-income workers have bigger incomes they 
individually consume smaller percentages of their income compared to low-income workers; 
and in economies with high inequality, they constitute a smaller part of the population so their 
overall consumption will be smaller than that of low-income workers.  
    In order to find the net increase in output and expenditure we follow the same method used 
in the case of lump sum taxation: 
  


])1([1
11
21
11
aa
ea L


  (29) 
  


])1([1
1)()1(1
21
22
aa
eTa Li


  (30) 
    The balanced budget multiplier show us that in the case of labor taxes skill endowments 
and labor supply elasticities also affect the maximum net increase in output and expenditure 
caused by increased government spending. More specifically, the bigger the endowment 
differences between individuals are, the bigger the skill gap, wage gap and the adverse effect 
of taxing high-skilled workers will be. Still, income inequality plays a part in determining the 
choice of taxation the government should make, but this choice should now take into 
consideration the differences in labor supply and elasticities, and the associated deadweight 
losses. In unequal societies where   21 1   , the crucial relationship the government 
examines remains almost the same as it was in lump-sum taxes, namely 
 11 1 LeTa  >  22 1)()1( Li eTa   . As in lump-sum taxes income inequality affects 
the maximum net increase in output and expenditure caused by an increase in government 
spending; but now, due to the skill endowment differences and different elasticities, the 
negative impact of taxing high-income individuals is bigger even in a highly unequal 
economy. Consequently it now takes a smaller percentage of people belonging to the high-
income group in order for the policy that brings the maximum net increase in output and 
expenditure, to change (i.e.  11 1 LeTa  <  22 1)()1( Li eTa   ); and the bigger the 
skill endowment i  and labor supply elasticity of high-income workers 2Le  are, the smaller 
this percentage needs to be.  
3.3. Government spending financed by profit taxes 
    Finally, we examine the case of taxes imposed on firm profits. This tax is a non-neutral 
profit tax similar to the one in Kreutzer and Lee (1988) and Lee (1998). Therefore, we assume 
a tax on profits equal to cit  which is similar in its effect to an ad-valorem or a per unit tax. 
Same as before, we modify equations (3), (4), (5) and (12), and get the budget constraints for 
each income group and for the government: 
  )1( 111  ctTPC    (31) 
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    Using equations (15) and the ones above gives us the total output function when profit 
taxation is used: 
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    We then differentiate equation (38) with respect to G, tc1 and tc2 just as we did in the 
previous cases and find: 
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    Equation (35) shows that the size of the government spending multiplier is once again 
positively affected by imperfect competition and income inequality. However this time the 
taxation of firm profits also has an effect on the multiplier meaning that the bigger taxes on 
firm profits are, the smaller the government spending multiplier becomes. The reason this 
happens is that if taxes are imposed on profits this reduces the incomes individuals receive 
from the firms they own, which in turn lowers their expenditure. This negative effect reduces 
the overall expenditure and output in the economy through the channel of the Keynesian 
multiplier. 
    Examining equations (36) and (37) we see that income inequality, the firms’ market power, 
and profit taxes affect the size of tax multipliers much like the public spending multiplier in 
equation (35). What is interesting to note however is that unlike the two previous cases, now 
taxes on firms owned by one income group influence public spending and consumption of 
both income groups. This is seen in equations (36) and (37) where the terms of market power, 
income inequality and the labor supply enter the numerator of the fractions of taxation of both 
income groups. The intuition behind this outcome is simple and based on Rosen and Gayer 
(2013): When a profit tax is imposed, the production of firms is reduced, the price paid by 
consumers increases while the price that the firm itself receives decreases. In addition, 
because both the price and the quantity produced are now smaller, that means that the profits 
of the firms taxed have been reduced. Individuals who have seen their profits reduced will 
buy fewer goods both from their own firms and from the ones owned by other people. 
Additionally firms may reduce their workers’ wages because of the decrease in profits and 
production. This eventually leads to a reduction of expenditure and output in the whole of the 
economy through the channel of the Keynesian multiplier. This result is shown by the product 
of the terms [ )()1( 21 iTaTa   ] with the term outside the parentheses ( 1  
and  2)1(   respectively).  
    When it comes to the reduction of government expenditure, the explanation above can be 
used. The government uses goods produced by the firms as inputs. Since production of firms 
has reduced and the prices have increased, production of public goods also decreases.  
    In order to find the net increase in output and expenditure we follow the same method used 
in the case of lump sum and labor taxation: 
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    Equations (38) and (39) show us that the net increase in output and expenditure is affected 
by the same factors as in the case of labor taxes, namely labor supply and it’s elasticity and by 
income inequality. Imperfect competition also has a negative effect on the size of the net 
increase of output and expenditure and in the limiting case where μ=0 the increase in taxation 
does not cause any decrease in output and expenditure.  
    The size of income inequality, this time alongside the firms’ market power, is still 
important in achieving the maximum net increase in output and expenditure. Looking at an 
unequal society where   21 1   , the crucial relationship the government needs to 
examine remains similar to the ones in the previous cases: 
 221121 )1]()()1([])()1([  GTaTaGTaTa ii . This 
result shows that, just as in the previous cases, in highly unequal societies the maximum net 
increase in expenditure and output comes when the government increases government 
spending and balances the budget by taxing the profits of Type 2 workers. This happens 
because when   21 1     the total consumption of Type 1 individuals is much bigger 
compared to the consumption of Type 2 people, because they individually consume much 
more than Type 2 people do and also because they are a much larger part of the population. 
Eventually when 12)1(   , the maximum increase in net expenditure and output 
comes when the government increases government spending and balances the budget by 
taxing the profits of low-skilled, low-income workers as the adverse effects on expenditure 
and output will be smaller because they now are the minority. 
 
4. Welfare analysis  
    The previous section has shown that income inequality plays a role in the increase of 
output and expenditure in the economy by affecting the size of fiscal multipliers. However, 
the net economic impact is not the only measure of the effectiveness of economic policy; we 
also need to see if a government’s fiscal policy can actually be Pareto improving for the 
people living in the economy. For this reason, we will examine the welfare effects that 
government policies have, using a methodology similar to Adam (2004) in order to measure 
welfare gains or losses from government policies.  
4.1 Lump sum taxation 
    If we want to make a complete evaluation of the welfare effects of government policy, we 
need to examine both the benefits of increased government spending and the losses of 
taxation. Government spending is assumed not to affect utility directly; therefore, our analysis 
is somewhat limited in scope. Utility increases only if the budget constraint of the individual 
increases. However, since individuals receive all the profits and wages in the economy the 
change in output and expenditure when government spending increases is sufficient for 
examining the effect of government spending as in Mankiw (1987). Therefore, we will use 
the balanced budget multiplier to examine the effect of government spending on utility. In 
order to calculate the welfare losses caused by taxation we will use a methodology similar to 
Adam (2004). We first derive the indirect utility functions for Type 1 and Type 2 workers 
using equations (1) (2) (4) and (5): 
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    Using these results, we calculate the general welfare function following Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2005)  
21 )1( WWW      (42) 
    We then calculate the loss in welfare (in absolute value) from imposing a lump-sum tax in 
each income group as: 
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    Equations (43) and (44) give us the welfare losses for an individual belonging to each of 
the two income groups  
    What is important for the evaluation of fiscal policy is to see whether government policies 
can be Pareto improving. Following Adam (2004), we will examine if the expected gains of 
government policies are bigger than the costs necessary to finance them. To examine that we 
compare the net economic effect of each spending-taxing plan has, with the welfare loss of 
each income group. First, we multiply equation (21) with   and equation (22) )1(   in 
order to find the net economic benefits that each income group that pays taxes has, and then 
we compare the results. The government’s policy mix can lead to a Pareto improvement only 
if the share of the net increase in output and expenditure caused by the increase of spending 
that each income group receives is bigger than its welfare losses caused by the taxes it pays to 
finance this increase i.e. :  
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    Equation (45) show us if government spending financed by taxing low-income people can 
be Pareto improving, while equation (46) show us if government spending financed by taxes 
on high-income people can be Pareto improving. We see that if the left hand side of (45) and 
(46) is bigger than or equal to zero then fiscal policy can be Pareto improving. The logic 
behind this result is simple: If the relationships above are true then the net increase of 
expenditure and output caused by increased government spending increases the welfare of 
both income groups; or at the very least keeps the welfare of the group that pays taxes steady 
while benefiting the group that does not pay taxes1. However, if the left hand side of (45) and 
(46) is negative, then although the increased output and expenditure benefits the group that 
does not pay taxes the welfare losses of the income group that pays taxes are so big that the 
increase in output and expenditure cannot compensate them.  
    In both equations, we see that imperfect competition increases welfare. We then examine 
the effect that our income inequality variable has on welfare by analyzing the effect of its two 
components. An increase in inequality means an increase in . A higher value of   increases 
the welfare gains brought about by the net increase in output and expenditure caused by (a 
balanced budget) increase in government spending; but at the same time it also increases the 
welfare losses that government policies have on the low-income group’s welfare. At the same 
time, increases in inequality reduce both the welfare gains as well as the welfare losses that 
the high-income group has due to government policies. Equations (45) and (46) also reveal 
the effect that the different MPCs have on the welfare losses caused by government policies. 
The bigger the MPC on the second term of the equation, the bigger welfare losses become. 
However this effect is somewhat lessened because the MPC is also the exponent of the price 
level and as the exponent increases the denominator of the fraction increases as well, which in 
turn means a smaller right hand side in (45) and (46).  
4.2 Labor taxation and profit taxation 
    After examining the case of lump-sum taxes, we examine the cases of labor income and 
profit taxation using the same method as in section 4.1. Beginning with labor taxes, we use 
equations (1), (2), (22) and (23) to derive the indirect utility functions of each income group; 
then we multiply these functions with the percentages of people belonging to each income 
group and compare them with equation (29) and (30): 
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1 Increased government spending  benefits both income groups or at least benefits the one that does not 
pay taxes while the welfare of the other group remains the same 
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    Just as in the previous section, we calculate the general welfare function. Differentiating 
with respect to 1Lt  and 2Lt  gives us the change in welfare caused by labor taxes: 
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    After multiplying (29) and (30) with  and )1(  respectively, we compare them with 
equations (49) and (50) 
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    The result is almost identical to the case of lump-sum taxes, the only difference being now 
that the elasticity of labor supply positively affects the welfare loss that taxation has. The 
reason this happens is due to the double effect of taxes we analyzed in section 3. When taxes 
on labor increase workers will find their income has been reduced. The product of the terms 
outside the parentheses and the first term inside the parentheses on the right hand side of 
equations (51) and (52) gives the change in welfare due to the reduction of income by taxes. 
However, as we have seen in the previous section workers might then choose to substitute 
labor for leisure (substitution effect) which leads them to reduce their labor supply and 
consequently face even bigger welfare losses. The product of the terms outside the 
parentheses with the elasticity of labor supply on the right hand side of equations (51) and 
(52) gives us the effect of the labor-leisure trade-off on welfare.  
    We then examine the case of profit taxation, by following the same process as the one 
above. We first use equations (1), (2), (31) and (32) to find the indirect utility functions: 
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    Differentiating with respect to profit taxes gives us the welfare losses of each income group 
in the case of profit taxes: 
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    Using the same process as in the previous cases, we have: 
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    The results are identical to (51) and (52) the only difference being that the elasticity of 
profits now takes the place of elasticity of labor supply. The product of the terms outside the 
parentheses with the first term inside on the right hand side of equations (57) and (58) show 
us the direct effect that profit taxes have on the welfare of firm owners by reducing their 
profits and income. The product of the terms outside the parentheses with the elasticity of 
profit taxes captures the welfare losses caused by the deadweight losses of profit taxes that we 
examined section 3.   
    In the three different cases that we examined we find that income inequality, represented by 
the MPC and the percentages of people belonging to low-income and high-income groups, 
has a positive effect on the welfare losses of the income group, which pays the taxes needed 
to finance government policies. Consequently, income inequality plays an important role in 
the choices that government should make, regarding its overall fiscal policy. As we have seen 
in sections 3 and 4 income inequality affects not just the maximum net increase in output and 
expenditure when public spending increases and is financed by taxation – in other words the 
net fiscal effect of government policies- but also the welfare effects that these policies can 
have and whether or not they can be Pareto improving. These results have important policy 
implications. It shows that government policies, which take into account income inequality in 
the economy, can not only promote economic growth by increasing the impact of 
expansionary policy on economic activities, but also improve welfare throughout the 
economy by using policies resulting in a Pareto improvement for both income groups.  
 
5. Conclusion 
    The purpose of this paper was to examine the effect of income inequality and imperfect 
competition on an economy’s fiscal policy. For this reason, we used a simple model of 
general equilibrium with imperfect competition in the goods market and heterogeneous agents 
with different skill endowments and as a result different wages. Using this model, we explore 
how the spending and taxing policy is affected. Results indicate that income inequality and 
firms’ market power positively affect the size of fiscal multipliers in an economy meaning 
that government spending and taxing multipliers in more unequal economies. Additionally 
using the balanced budget multiplier, we see that income inequality and imperfect 
competition also affect the net economic effect of government policies. More specifically in 
more unequal societies, where the majority of the population has low incomes, the maximum 
net increase in output and expenditure comes when the government increases government 
spending and then taxes the minority of high-income workers. However, as the percentage of 
high-income workers increases, fiscal multipliers become smaller and the impact of spending 
and taxation changes. Consequently, for sufficiently high percentages of high-income workers 
the maximum net increase in output and expenditure comes when the government increases 
spending and taxes the minority of low-income workers. Finally, we examine the welfare 
effects of government policies. Results show us that increased government spending financed 
by taxation can benefit both income groups; or at least benefit the income group that does not 
pay any taxes while eliminating the welfare losses of the income group that pays taxes, 
leading to a Pareto improvement. Income inequality plays an important part once again 
because it positively affects welfare losses. These results suggest that fiscal policy which 
takes into account the income inequality between individuals and uses the right mix of 
spending and taxation can help stabilize the economy and promote growth while minimizing 
the welfare losses of fiscal policy and lead to Pareto improvements. 
    The model could be extended in several different directions. One way would be by taking 
into account the way that public spending can affect individual consumption and welfare. 
Additionally labor market with imperfect competition between high skilled and low skilled 
workers might make this analysis more realistic.  
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